Due in large part to Okinawa’s frustration with the domineering presence of U.S. military personnel and the crimes associated with their existence on the island, the Japanese government has decided to foot a large portion of the bill that has been appropriated for the move of 8,000 marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam by the year 2014. (1) According to the Marianas Variety (Guam Ed.), this build-up is estimated at about $15 billion and Japan is paying for more than $6 billion of that cost. The build-up however, does not only encompass military personnel and their families, but thousands of construction workers and other civilian Defense Department employees. The decision to transfer troops from Okinawa to Guam occurred in 2006, following an agreement that was struck between the Bush administration and the Japanese Government. (2) The transferring of the Marines from Okinawa to Guam is only one part of the larger agreement named “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” or “2006 Roadmap,” to consolidate American troops in Okinawa and reduce the burden of the military presence on Okinawan soil. (Click here to read about the “2006 Roadmap” agreement).
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), however, often tells a different story. In a letter dated April 9, 2009 to Congressional Committees with the subject “High-level Leadership Needed to Help Guam Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth,” the GAO claims that the build-up is part of an effort “to improve the U.S. military’s flexibility to address conventional and terrorist threats worldwide.” (3) Similarly, Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton seemed to believe that this build-up was part of the “U.S. commitment to modernize” the U.S.’s “military posture in the Pacific.” (4) This viewpoint obviously fails to mention the struggles that the citizens of Okinawa have experienced in an attempt to remove U.S. military personnel from their island. “It took more than a decade for the Clinton and Bush administrations to negotiate agreements with Japan to reduce the U.S. military presence on Okinawa, including relinquishing a Marine Corps airfield on the crowded southern end of the island.” (5) Essentially, this removal has taken a long time in materializing, despite the growing disapproval of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. Therefore, while strengthening the military’s strategic positioning in the Pacific may be a by-product of this move- it was certainly not its main intention.
This build-up is so immense that “military members and their families would create roughly a 14 percent increase in Guam’s current population of 171,000.” (6) An increase this substantial in such a short period of time would affect any community, but on the relatively small island of Guam, it will most likely be disastrous. A great deal of this concern has been reflected by a GAO report that speaks about the uncertainty of the move due to the “capacity of Guam’s infrastructure” or lack thereof. (7) In addition to this population increase, there is a need for “an estimated 22,000 additional construction workers” (8) due to the massive amount of construction work that needs to be done in order to support this build-up.
The build-up not only includes the move of U.S. Marines to Okinawa, but extensive plans to improve the infrastructure logistics and waterfront capabilities of Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base Guam. (9) These projects are listed below:
Below are excerpts from the background information on the military build-up presented by Brian J. Lepore (Director of Defense Capabilities and Management), in his testimony before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate. It is information that helps to contextualize the military build-up and how such a plan ever came into existence.
"Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has based forces in Okinawa and other locations in Japan. The U.S. military occupation of Japan ended in 1952, but the United States administered the Ryuku Islands, including Okinawa, until 1972. Efforts to address the Japanese population’s concerns regarding U.S. military presence in Okinawa began more than a decade ago. One chief complaint is that the Okinawa prefecture hosts over half of the U.S. forces in Japan and that more than 70 percent of the U.S. land forces utilized in Japan are on Okinawa. Many citizens of Okinawa believe the U.S. presence has hampered economic development. The public outcry in Okinawa following the September 1995 abduction and rape of an Okinawan school girl by three U.S. service members brought to the forefront long-standing concerns among the Okinawan people about the effects of the U.S. military presence on the island. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, at that time, the continued ability of the United States to remain in Japan was at risk, and it was important to reduce the effects of the U.S. military presence on the Okinawan people. To address these concerns, bilateral negotiations between the United States and Japan began and the Security Consultative Committee established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa in November 1995. The committee developed recommendations about ways to limit the effects of the U.S. military presence on Okinawa, by closing Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and relocating forces from that base to another base on Okinawa, and recommended numerous other operational changes. On December 2, 1996, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and State, and the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency issued the committee’s final report."
"…In 2004, the United States and Japan began a series of sustained security consultations aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan security alliance to better address today’s rapidly changing global security environment. DOD’s Defense Policy Review Initiative established a framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan designed to create the conditions to reduce the burden on Japanese communities and create a continuing presence for U.S. forces in the Pacific theater by relocating units to other areas, including Guam. This initiative also includes a significant reduction and reorganization of the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa to include relocation of 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents to Guam. More than 10,000 Marines and their dependents will remain stationed in Okinawa after this relocation. Another initiative includes the closure and reestablishment of Maine Corps Air Station Futenma, to a less densely populated location on Okinawa by the 2014 goal, due to local concerns involving safety and noise. DOD officials view the success of the Futenma replacement facility as a key objective of the initiative that will need to be completed in order for other realignment actions to take place…" (11)
The massive military move to Guam is therefore inextricably bound to the relocation plans in Okinawa, which is important in understanding how our islands are being affected by a larger military agenda within the Pacific as part of USPACOM’s (U.S. Pacific Command) mission and vision which claims to “promote security and peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region.” (12) Below are more of the costs associated with promoting the build-up. These numbers will help one gain a better understanding of the scope of such an immense transfer and how many millions of dollars are being requested to ensure that all military personnel are being taken care of. Such large amounts of money speak to the intensity of this transfer and the way in which the landscape of the Marianas will be forever changed. Keep in mind that these dollars are all being poured into projects that pertain solely to the care of military personnel, not the residents of Guam or the island’s civilian infrastructure.
Recently, concerns raised by members of U.S. Congress include important decisions such as “who should be able to qualify for military housing contracts and construction jobs on Guam, whether sufficient training facilities within and around Guam can be ready on time to meet a realignment deadline of 2014, and whether Guam’s civilian infrastructure will even be ready for the impact of a population explosion as Marines start arriving as early as next year.” (14)
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(1) Lapore, Brian J.. "Defense Infrastructure; Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military Build-Up on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges yet to be Addresssed." GAO Testimony Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.. 1 May 2008; 1.
(2) Pincus, Walter. "House Would Sharply Raise Cost of Guam Project." The Washington Post 30 June 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/29/AR2009062904119.html>.
(4) Pincus, 1.
(6) Pincus, 1.
(7) Associated Press. "“GAO report hints at delay in Guam relocation” Marine Corps Times 2 May 2008.
(8) The Washington post, Ibid.
(9) Lapore, Brian J.. "Defense Infrastructure; Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military Build-Up on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges yet to be Addresssed." GAO Testimony Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.. 1 May 2008; 7.
(10) Ibid.
(12) Wong, Lt. Col Kevin. "USPACOM." U.S. Pacific Command: Perspective of the Pacific. 28 Feb. 2007. <www.dod.mil/pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf>.
(13) Fallon, Admiral William J. "Statement of Admiral William J. Fallon, U.S. Navy Commander U.S. Pacific Command Before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Military Construction on Military Construction in U.S. Pacific Command." 7 Mar. 2007. <http://www.dod.mil./dodgc/olc/docs/TestFallon070307-HAC.doc >